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ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES

sile uranium (ma~nly U-233) produced by
meet this requirement~ but nuclear data
neutron capture m thorium. This is recy
Table 4. Fissile Inventory required for
are too uncertain to allow an accurate
1GWe
reactor
cled and successive generations of fuel
prediction of attainable burn-up. More
require smaller amounts of external fis
experimental work is required in this
Amount
s!le ':laterial until an equilibrium situa
(Mg)
Source
area.
tion IS reached. Table 2 shows U-235
So, to summarize, use of thorium
Highly
enriched
requirements for successive generations
~ycles in Candu reactors considerably
uranium (93%)
4.5
871Mg
of a particular cycle.
mcreases the energy obtainable from a
natural
The fuel burn-up for the successive
uranium
given uranium resource base. It seems
Fissile plutonium
4.9
-1800Mg of
generations is maintained constant at
that the proven Candu design can be
spent Candu
29.3MWdlkg highly enriched uranium.
adapted to the thorium cycle with little
fuel, or
After four generations, the U-235
or no modification. The main develop
·-800Mg of
r~quirements have reached an equilib
spent LWR
ments required before a thorium cycle
fuel
nu~ level _of a little over 4g/kg highly
can be implemented arc in the areas of
~nnched With the remaining fissile load
fuel reprocessing and fabrication. The
mg ~oming from the spent fuel of the
tactical advantages of using thorium fuel
previous generation. This equilibrium
in once-through fuel cycles during the
Economic evaluation of thorium
level_of external fissile requirements is a
introductory
phase are being investi
cycles is uncertain since costs can only be
functiOn of the desired fuel burn-up as
gated. For the recycle mode, fuel cycle
derived for conceptual designs of repro
costs are higher than those "for uranium
shown in table 3 for U-235-topped
cessing and refabrication facilities which
thorium cycle s4.
once-through systems but likely trends in
have not yet been demonstrated. Cur
uranium price could make thorium cycles
The requirements for three thorium
rent studies indicate that the fuelling
economically attractive in the next cen
cycles are compared with those for the
costs of the thorium cycle are greater
tury. The economic viability of the self
natural uranium, once-through cycle.
than those for once-through natural
sufficient
equilibrium thorium cycle is
The equilibrium U-235 concentration in
uranium fuelling and will be equal only if
more uncertain but offers the potential
fresh fuel increases with the desired
the natural uranium price rises to at least
of insurance against uranium shortages
burn-up. This has also been expressed as
$200/kg u.
and an upper limit to nuclear energy
the Candu reactor lifetime requirements
The self-sufficient equilibrium
costs
from Candu.
(assuming a 30-year life at an average
thorium (SSET) cycle illustrated in table
load factor of 80 per cent) for natural
3 is important from a strategic view
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ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES
bi"i§eder spent fuel have been shown to
be technically feasible. These techniques
include CIVEX, AIROX, pyrometal
lurgical processes such as the tin nitride
process, and high-volatility methods .1
Recently, these methods have gained
increased attention in the United States
and elsewhere because of concern over
the potential for diversion of reactor
grade plutonium from the relatively
purified product stream of the PURE X
process. 2
Methods of processing
·The PUREX process was developed
from military operations in the United
States during the 1940s at Hanford.
Because PUREX was designed for
weapons applications some people have
suggested that other methods should be
developed for civilian applications. 3
These methods involve either modifica
tions of the PUREX process, such as
co-processing, 4 Pu-238 spiking methods 5
and the CIVEX process for breeder
fuel, 6 or are based on entirely separate
techniques such as salt transport and
pyrometallurgy. 1
In comparing these technologies, it
must be remembered that PUREX
remains the most technically advanced.
So, for other methods to compete sue-

be increased either by making it almost
impossible to obtain such material,
and/or ensuring that the product of the
process is not easily convertible to a
weapons usable status. The first charac
teristic can be achieved by strengthening
international safeguards, e.g., physical
surveillance, installation of detection
instruments, etc. The second charac
teristic is a function of the in he rent prop
erties of the reprocessing technology
itself.
While safeguards are important, this
paper explores the possibility for
increasing diversion resistance as a func
tion of this second characteristic. With
reference to the illustration it is steps 1
and 3 that most concern us here; step 2 is
subject to physical containment while
step 4 is outside the scope of this
analysis.
Favourable properties
We can define three principal attri
butes of inherent process diversion resis
tance: dilution of the weapons usable
material in the product-waste streams;
physical inability to extract weapons
usable material from the streams (or a
limited extraction capability); and con
version process and handlingdifficul ties.
A product stream of weapons grade

Steps in the process of an aHempt to divert nuclear materials from a nuclear power fuel
facility for explosive purposes.
Step 1
Obtain
Material
from
Product
Stream

Step 2
Transport
Material
to
Laboratory
Location

cessfully, they must not only be shown to
appreciably increase diversion resis
tance but to do so without adverse
economic effects.
To assess the relative diversion resis
tance of the various reprocessing
methods, it is useful to establish a set of
generic characteristics that define a pro
cess that is acceptably diversion resis- ·
tant. This paper describes two methods
for doing this. In a hypothetical diver
sion attempt, four major steps are
involved (as shown in the illustration
above). This paper is limited to a dis
cussion of the difficulties of the first
three steps in this process.
Diversion resistance characteristics
The purpose of making diversion
resistance a design criterion is to minim
ize the likelihood of a successful diver
sion of nuclear material. Resistance can
48

Step 3
Process and
Further Refine
material
to Weapons
Usable
Quality

Step 4
Fabricate
Nuclear
Explosive

-

quality is most desirable for would-bt:
divertors. Product streams offering less
than weapons grade offer some diver
sion resistance. Co-processing of
plutonium with uranium does not affect
the recyclability of the recovered mater
ial to power reactors but does increase
the amount of additional processing
necessary by a potential divertor. Low
decontamination factors (of the order of
103 ) not only pose health hazards to
divertors but means they need a know
ledge of remote handling equipment. A
low concentration of weapons usable
material means large volumes must be
div~rted to obtaip significant quantities.
Thts would essentially eliminate a
:·one-shot deal" and statistically
Increase the probability of detection.
If the piping network is complex a
potential divertor needs a more com
prehensive knowledge of the process

before he can successfully obtain the
material. However, it also makes detec
tion by international authorities more
difficult; it is easier to monitor and detect
accounting errors when there are com·
paratively few product/effluent streams.
So from an "easier-to-detect" view
point processes with less complex pro·
cessing sequences are considered more
diversion resistant.
Material that is difficult to handle is
less likely to be successfully diverted.
High radiation levels (low decontamina·
tion factors) affect the handling diffi·
culty. High temperature liquid metals
and salts are harder to handle than room
temperature aqueous solutions making
diversion less likely. Gaseous streams
are harder to tap and disperse easil~ i~
the event of a loss of containment; thtsiS
particularly true for high pressure pro
cesses.
Just as important as the factors discus·
sed above is the ease by which the pro·
cess can be diluted and/or fission product
spiked. If diluents and/or spiking agents
can be introduced into the process
stream diversion can be made extremely
difficult and any diverted material can be
rendered essentially useless for actual
explosive purposes.
Decision analysis techniques
In general techniques available for
'
selecting between
processes can. be
categorized into two groups; the steve
approach and the ranking approach.
The Sieve approach consists of sequen
tial elimination of candidates through
successive application of criteria. These
criteria are usually defined in rank o~der
as primary, secondary and ter:~a&
criteria. This approach has been ~I eh
.
f or exa mple ' m t "te
used by geologists;
selection of a high-level waste reposi
ory.
oo~
In the sieve approach, a proce~s n
0
tinues to be a candidate only if_It ~ n
tinues to meet the higher order cnt~ro
It emerges as a potential candidate~ a~e
only if it meets all the criteria. 1 ~ m_t ·
.
e cntena IS
course of the analysts a~y ~n
and the
not met the process is ehmmated
d of
next process analyzed. This metho that
analysis defines those procesdses not
. d . ·a but oes
meet all reqUire cnten
.
erits
give an indication of the relative m
of the processes analyzed.
10 ped in
The ranking approach, dev~ deci
the formal discipline of Bayesta~·tatiVe
sion analysis 8 allows for a quan Itives
.
'
·
of alterna
·
relative companson
Juated
Reprocessing methods can be eva et of
for their performance under .a·~n can
criteria (or attributes) a~dyro~~~nce of
be made for differe~ce 10• tm6e analysis.
each attribute quantified tn t
n the
. d t"f".eren ce .betwee
The principal
h sieve
two approaches is that whtle t e
L

d
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Application of the ranking decision analysis approach to the reprocessing technology selection process.
Reprocessing
technology

AIROX
Halide volatility
PUREX
Salt transport
Tin nitride

Development
time
(year)
Overt*
1.5
0.8
0.5

Covert
5

0.02t

5
5

1.5

~

Warning
period
%of task to
be completed
Overt
90

SO
<1
<1
90

Covert
,_
3
1-2
1
1
1-3

Radiation level
(Rlhr at
1m from
source)

Criticality
problem
level

Development
cost
(101 $ 1975)

6.6
10 3 -10 •
10 4 -10 •
10 3-10 •
0.66

Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Low

5 5-8
4:5-7
2
1
5.5-8

Overall renldng
Overt
-0.31
-0.24

Covert
-0.23
-0.18
-0. 18
-0.24
-0.23

-0.09
-0.12
-0.31

*Overt
or .not a
·
tin theand
salt covert
trans refer
ort ato whether
h
. no
. n-weapons_ s ta te a~tempts to divert
material from the commercial plant either covertly or overtl
processing is
form
o t the process. streams in the plant. If diversion occurs at that point
or an exp 1os1ve. n a 11 other matenals, many success1ve stages are necessary.

ne~essa~~~ ~:q~:~~o~~~~e~s~~t~~i~l~etalllc

f·

approach evaluates a process against a
set ~f criteria applied sequentially, the
ran~mg approach evaluates a process
agamst multiple criteria simultaneously.
The r~nking approach has the advantage
of bemg able to quantitatively compare
alternatives relative to each other while
the sieve approach must rely on a more
absolute determination of an acceptable
alternative.
To demonstrate these techniques, five
reprocessing methods have been
selected for analysis. These include
AIROX, halide volatility, PUREX, salt
tra.;•sJ?ort and the tin nitride processes.
Thts ts not a complete list of available
alternatives, but these five have been
chosen to represent the wide range of
process types available.
The AIROX 9 process is a low decon
tamination reprocessing technique that
ta~es ~he spent fuel through successive
oxtdatiOn and reduction stages using
oxygen and hydrogen. The oxidation
step is also used for decladding as U02
expands 30 per cent by volume when it
changes to U30s. The halide volatility
technique converts the spent fuel to the
hexafluorides and then separates them
by the difference in their boiling points.
The great majority of fission products
form fluorides which volatilize at high
temperatures. Of the fluorides which
volatilize more readily than uranium
hexafluoride, only tellurium hexaf
luoride is a gas at ordinary temperatures
so it can be separated readily. Uranium
hexafluoride boils at 56.2°C and
plutonium hexafluoride at 62.3°C so it is
easy to separate them.
The PUREX process is the only
commercially available reprocessing
technique. It is an aqueous solvent
extraction technique and is described in
detail in several sources'" and so will not
be described here.
The salt transport process was
designed for plutonium recovery from
LMFBR fuels. Decladding is aecmn-
plished by immersing fuel sub
assemblies in liquid zinc at about 850°C.
The uranium oxide and plutonium oxide
November 1979
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in the fuel are converted to metal before
going through a series of liquid metal
molten salt solvent extractions yielding
metallic uranium and plutonium. The tin
nitride process involves dissolving the
spent fuel in liquid tin followed by selec
tive nitriding of uranium. The fission
products either form nitrides or inter
metallics both of which float; the
uranium nitride precipitates out along
with the plutonium and other actinide
nitrides.
A sample quantitative analysis
The sieve and ranking methods will
now be applied to the five reprocessing
technologies described earlier to show
how the method works and compare the
results. The first, or primary, criterion
applied in this example is that plutonium
must not be separated out during repro
cessing. This criterion is met by only two
of the five processes; AIROX and tin
nitride. The halide volatility, PURE X
and salt transport processes aim at pro
ducing a relatively pure stream of
plutonium and therefore violate the
primary criterion. AIROX and tin nit
ride, however, not only do not separate
out plutonium but_cannot do so. In fact,
the applicability of the oxidation
reduction reactions proposed in the
AIROX process for uranium fuels have
not been experimentally verified for
plutonium.
Both AIROX and tin nitr¥!c arc low
decontamination processes and as such
handling is difficult. The process temp
eratures arc aTso high. The materials in
the tin nitride process are probably har
der to handle since thcv arc dissolved in
molten tin at around 150<YC. The
AJROX process, because it uses hyd
rogen in one of the unit operations, could
force the divertor to face explosion risks.
Though neither of these processes are
extremely complex, they lend them
selves to dilution as a means of reducing
the concentration of fissile material in
the product stream. In the AIROX pro
cess dilution could be affected after
decl~dding is complete and the uranium

~0 outside

oxide pellets arc pulverized.
The tin nitride process offers easier
dilution as it is merely necessary tn
reduce the input of spent fuel into the
molten tin bath at the time of initial dis
solution. Spiking agents can also be
added at dilution making the fissile mat
erial less desirable to the potential diver
tor. However, increasing the number of
spiking agents can adversely effect the
reactivity coefficient in a reactor causing
significant economic enrichment penal
tics to compensate for a reduction in
reactivity. These penalties arc sufficient
enough to warrant a careful co~t-bcncfit
comparison of process economics with
diversion resistance.
From this analysis the A IROX and tin
nitride processes are found to be most
diversion resistant; both technologies
offer handling difficulties due to low
decontamination and high procesli
temperatures. The AIROX pmce~s
poses an explosion danger to the diver
tor whereas the tin nitride proces~ is
more amenable to dilution.
The ranking approach emplo)ed to
distinguish between the sample repro-
cessing technologies is that developed b)'
Papazogluet a/' 1 at Ma!;sachu!>etls Jn:.ti
tute of Technology. This method is
based on the principles of multi-attribute
decision theory wherein a ~~ of indiceli
or attributes which characterize the pro
liferation resistance of the technologies
is defined and evaluated.
For this particular application, a~~ of
five attributes arc considered important
to a potential divcrtnr"s dcci~ion to u~ a
given technology to derive weapom
material. The first attribute i~ the
den~lopmcnt time, or the time it takes
from start to fini~h to develop a nuclear
explo~ive using diverted nuclear mater
ial. The warning period, defined as the
percentage of the development tas.k left
to complete at the time of detection by
outside agents, is the second attribute.
The third is the inherent diffirult) of
utilizing the technology as a source of
nuclear fissile material. defined further
by a breakdown into three sub-attributes
51

ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES
- the radioactivity level of the process,
the status of sci~ntific and technical
information known about the process by
the potential proliferator, and the level
of criticality probkm associated with the
process. The fourth attribute is the
weapons material quality, defined as the
type of nuclear material diverted (i.e.,
either weapons or reactor grade
plutonium, or enriched uranium (U-233
or U-235)), and the fifth is the develop
ment cost of the explosive construction
attempt.
Numerical values of resistance
To derive a quantitative indicator of
the relative diversion resistance of each
technology, a value function for each
attribute has been defined so that a
dimensionless numerical indicator for
each technology can be calculated. The
numerical indicators for each attribute
are then multiplied by weighting factors
and summed over the number of attri
butes to arrive at a single numerical
indicator for each fuel cycle strategy.
Basically, the purpose of the value func
tion is to provide a numerical measure of
the relative attractiveness of the various
proliferation pathways available to the
would-be proliferator.
The results of the analysis show, on a
scale of -1 to 0, that the AIRO X and tin
nitride processes are most diversion
resistant overall and that PURE X is the
least resistant (see the table). These
results occur because of the greater
development time necessary for explo
sive· construction, the lower status of
information concerning the processes
and the higher development costs. Also,
the higher radiation levels make these
processes more diversion resistant. The
salt transport process shows good diver
sion resistance for the covert case, but
not for the overt case. Its overall ranking
of -0.24 is close enough to that of
AIROX and tin nitride (both -0.23) to
consider them essentially the same.
Although the salt transport process pro
duces metallic plutonium, the medium
level criticality problem posed to the
potential divertor contributes to its
diversion resistance.
However, that the ultimate choice
between reprocessing technologies must
not be based solely on a single criterion
such as diversion resistance but on other
important selection criteria as well, such
as economics, environmental and safety
aspects. is evident. The nuclear industry
today is at a cross road and the prolifera
tion issue is only one among many other
major concerns. Technologies that do
not meet diversion resistance standards
need to be clearly identified and alter
nate technologies developed that can
simultaneously optimize all important
52

selection criterion. Other aspects that
can be expected to influence the decision
include: the effect a choice of an alter
nate reprocessing technology will have
on existing fuel cycle facilities and
economics; impact on reactivity and
reactor design (e.g., effect on enrich
ment levels and burnable poison man
agement); waste management implica
tions; and the stage of development of
the alternatives.
Research and development decisions
must not be based solely on political con
siderations; they must also be based on
sound technical analysis. Utilization of
quantitative decision analysis techniques
can provide the required firm foundation
for technical decisions. Application of
these methods compels policy makers to
define clearly the criteria upon which
they evaluate alternatives and to record
their personal preferences and biases
towards the importance of each criteria.
Equally as important is the mechanism
that decision analysis provides for updat
ing the evaluation in the light of new data
and experimental evidence. All of these
factors suggest that such methods should
be more widely applied and accepted in
the policy making arena.
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Plutoniunt processing for
th~ fast reactor· fuel cycle
By R. H. Allardice* and H. A. Taylort
Current Dounreay and Windscale experience in reprocessing,
fabrication and plutonium waste operations together with the
continuing UK development programme to establish process and
plant design for larger scale operations is described in this paper·
The necessity for considering these fuel cycle operations as an
entity and avoiding the independent optimization of individual
areas, in order to obtain the preferred balance for safe and
reliable Pu processing operations is emphasized.
Following the decision made in the late
1960s to construct the Prototype Fast
Reactor- PFR (600MWth, 250e) on the
same site at Dounreay as the Experi
mental Fast Reactor- DFR (60MWth,
15e ), it was decided in 1970/71 to com
plete the fuel cycle by reprocessing the
irradiated fuel in the near term rather
than at a later date. (A typical fast
breeder reactor fuel cycle is shown in
Fig. 1.) This policy was adopted not only
to reduce the PFR plutonium inventory
*United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.
Dounreay.
tBritish Nuclear Fuels Limited, Risley.

and to take the reactor operation
through the full fuel recycle stages, but
more significantly to demonstrate and
prove the viability of the whole fuel cycle
and to explore all facets of the reproces
sing and associated waste treatment.
It was decided to modify and extend
the existing DFR metallic uranium fuel
reprocessing plant which also offered. t~t
opportunity to demonstrate the poss1bi 
ity of extending the life of r.e~unda~~
highly active plant. A schematic dlustr.
tion of the modified building is shown ill
Fig. 2. These modifications were com
pleted in 1979. The plant will start
reprocessing high burn-up fuel (at 8· 10
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